Introduction
DRI assesses digital risks to elections on the basis of a defined method, which can be consulted here. In this brief, we focus only on one specific risk: The electoral system. The risk assessment method notes: “Majoritarian electoral systems may be more vulnerable, especially when lead candidates/parties are close (high return on investment for manipulative interference)” We look at this aspect for the upcoming parliamentary elections in France.
It is important to note that every electoral system has pros and cons. This brief only points at disinformation risks, which tend to be higher in majoritarian systems. DRI does not advocate for any specific electoral system.
How does the French Electoral System for Parliament (Assemblée Nationale) work?
A candidate wins the seat in the first round of the elections when he/she gains more than 50% of the vote with a voter turn-out of at least 25%. If no candidate is elected in the first round on 30 June, candidates who have not won the support of 12.5% of voters registered in that constituency (not: votes cast) are eliminated for the second round.
The remaining candidates go for the second round on 7 July. Typically, the second round is fought between two or three candidates. Candidates for the second round can also withdraw their candidature. This happens, for example, if they do not have strong chances and want voters to support another candidate instead.
Why does such a system pose higher disinformation risks?
Disinformation actors will look for close races, i.e. situations where forecasts indicate that candidates run neck-on-neck. In such races, it is enough to change the behavior of a small number of voters (change their voting intention, mobilize abstainers, make motivated voters abstain) to change the outcome: the allocation of that seat to the preferred party. It is, of course, for the same reason that parties invest particularly in such races.
Candidates to Parliament are more vulnerable to disinformation
- Detection: With a small campaigning team, they are less likely to notice disinformation on some platforms quickly.
- Analysis/attribution: They are less likely than government ministers or lead politicians to have tools to understand the extent and spread of a disinformation campaign. They are also less likely to be able to swiftly refute manufactured information, especially things like synthetic media (voice cloning, synthetic video).
- Response: They are also less likely to quickly adopt a systematic communicative response and to establish contacts with relevant platforms, factcheckers or law enforcement.
The French Electorate is polarized
What to do?
Social media platforms should give particular attention to close electoral races, especially in the second round of the French elections, based on opinion polls and to the most sensitive time period, the last days before election day. Last-minute disinformation has the advantage that it makes it difficult for concerned parties to respond in time. In addition, the silence period on the election day and the day before means that many media may be hesitant to cover electoral information from candidates.
The platforms’ trust and safety teams should code monitoring efforts to this effect, i.e., giving particular attention to the names and numbers of such constituencies and the names of the relevant candidates. They should be prepared to act fast in enforcing their self-regulation and legal obligations to avoid harms. Fact-checkers and cybersecurity experts should likewise give particular attention to close races.
Political parties should train their candidates and campaigning teams to meet this challenge and to establish rapid reporting lines for candidates to their HQs. Party HQs need to inform platforms and authorities instantly of emerging disinformation attempts.
Media should be prepared to navigate the restrictions of the electoral silence period with the need to counter possible disinformation.