Executive Summary
Following our report from 28 November, we revisited TikTok’s “Murky Accounts”—those that impersonate candidates, exhibit signs of inauthenticity, or use fake engagements to amplify political content—in the context of the Romanian elections. In the six days since 28 November, we identified 48 additional, newly-created accounts that either impersonated candidate Călin Georgescu or raised serious concerns about their authenticity and engagement practices.
In this report, we also examined TikTok’s Commercial Content Library, which should list all active ads on the platform. Despite TikTok’s policy prohibiting political advertising—including ads that reference, promote, or oppose candidates or solicit votes—we found 49 political ads supporting Călin Georgescu. These ads were placed in 12 EU countries, Switzerland, and the UK, primarily targeting the Romanian diaspora, which numbers nearly seven million individuals. The ads collectively reached 300,000 TikTok users.
By failing to address the issue of murky accounts and enforce its own policies on political ads, TikTok risks violating its obligations under Articles 33 and 34 of the Digital Services Act (DSA) to protect democratic processes and civic discourse in the EU.
The European Commission’s Guidelines on Election Integrity under the DSA specifically highlight in Measure h) i) that impersonation, fake engagements, and coordinated inauthentic behavior are significant risks to electoral processes. Additionally, Measure e) iii) states that platforms prohibiting political advertising must “have efficient verification systems in place and take the necessary actions to ensure that the decision is appropriately enforced.”
Update: Yesterday, we sent a detailed list of all flagged accounts and ads to TikTok. After reviewing today, we found that the platform had removed 42 out of the 48 flagged murky accounts, as well as all 49 political ads.
Flagging ‘Murky Accounts’: A Sisyphus Task
On 28 November we published a report flagging 47 active accounts1 on TikTok that violated the platform’s rules on impersonation and showed signs of coordinated inauthentic behaviour or the use of fake engagements. After sharing our findings with TikTok, the platform removed 41 of these accounts, thereby acknowledging they violated their community guidelines.
A week later, on 3 December, we conducted the same exercise and found an additional 48 accounts that either appeared to impersonate candidate Călin Georgescu or raised significant concerns about their authenticity and the use of fake engagement. Several of these accounts already had thousands of followers within days of their creation. Many of them only share content related to Mr. Georgescu, often reposting the same videos. Table No. 1 lists these accounts.
Table 1: TikTok Accounts Supporting candidate Călin Georgescu with Potential TT’s Policy Violations
There is More to It: Weren’t Political Ads Banned on TikTok?
For this report, we also explored TikTok’s Commercial Content Library, a repository of all ads active on the platform, including ads that are not presently active or paused by the advertisers. This library is part of TikTok’s compliance with Article 39 of the DSA, which requires Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) and Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSEs) to compile and make all advertisements on the platform publicly available “in a specific section of their online interface, through a searchable and reliable tool that allows multi-criteria queries (…)”.
TikTok’s official policies state that the platform does not permit “political content to feature in advertising” which includes paid ads, creators being paid to produce branded political content, and other promotional tools. TikTok provides the following examples of what is prohibited:
- “Referencing, promoting, or opposing candidates or nominees for public office, political parties, or elected Referencing, promoting, or opposing candidates or nominees for public office, political parties, or elected or appointed government officials,
- Advocacy for or against past, current, or proposed referenda, ballot measures, and legislative, judicial, or regulatory outcomes or processes. This includes ads that promote or attack government policies or track records.
- Referencing, promoting, or selling merchandise that features prohibited individuals, entities, or content, including campaign slogans, symbols, or logos
- References to an election, including voter registration, voter turnout, and appeals for votes, such as ads that encourage people to vote”
Despite TikTok’s policy, a simple search using the name of candidate Călin Georgescu revealed 48 ads referencing or promoting his candidacy or encouraging votes for him. These political ads were placed in the UK as well as several European Union countries, including Germany, Spain, Romania, Italy, France, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. The majority of these ads seemed to target the Romanian diaspora. Collectively, the ads reached at least 300,000 TikTok users, with most being shown in the days leading up to and immediately following the first round of elections. Research indicates that the voting share for far-right parties among Romanians living abroad (more than seven million) was high.
Yesterday, we submitted to TikTok a detailed breakdown of these ads and their potential violations of their political ads policies. To protect the privacy of non-public individuals, we have decided not to publish this list.
Notably, several accounts paid for the same political ads multiple times. A closer examination of the advertisers’ profiles also revealed that the accounts were created very recently and exclusively posted content promoting Mr. Georgescu (See, for example, screenshots No. 1 and No. 2).
TikTok Risks Breaching DSA Obligations
As a VLOP, TikTok has a legal responsibility under the DSA to identify and mitigate systemic risks in the European Union. In our previous report, we stressed the urgent need for TikTok to address the issue of “murky accounts” proactively, as they pose a significant risk to the integrity of elections in Romania.
This urgency is heightened by evidence that TikTok is not enforcing its policies on political advertising either. This raises serious concerns that the platform is being exploited by political parties and candidates to circumvent its rules on Government, Politician, and Political Party Accounts. Crucially, according to TikTok’s own policies, accounts identified in this category are prohibited from advertising altogether.
Our findings demonstrate that TikTok’s enforcement of its political ad policies is, at the very least, inadequate. A simple search for Mr. Călin Georgescu’s name in TikTok’s Commercial Content Library revealed multiple ads promoting his candidacy. If these violations are so easily detectable, there is no justification for TikTok’s inaction.
By failing to act, TikTok risks violating its obligations under Articles 33 and 34 of the DSA to protect democratic processes and civic discourse in the EU.
The European Commission’s Guidelines on Election Integrity under the DSA highlights, in Measure h) i), that impersonation, fake engagements, and coordinated inauthentic behavior pose significant risks to electoral processes.
Furthermore, in Measure e) iii), the Guidelines state that when platforms do not allow political advertising on their services, they must “have efficient verification systems in place and take the necessary actions to ensure that the decision is appropriately enforced.” These potential breaches of the DSA align with recent enforcement measures by the European Commission, which on 29 November issued an additional Request for Information to TikTok concerning its role in the Romanian elections.
Recommendations
Considering that the second round of the Romanian elections will take place next Sunday (8 December), TikTok should urgently take the following actions:
- Remove all accounts in Romania and other regions that violate its guidelines, ensuring compliance with platform rules.
- Remove all ads referencing or promoting political candidates, including those supporting Mr. Călin Georgescu’s candidacy, in line with its policies on political advertising.
- Enhance its policies and community guidelines to improve transparency and platform integrity, meeting or exceeding the standards set by other major social media platforms.
- Conduct a comprehensive investigation into the platform’s role in the Romanian presidential elections and publicly disclose the findings.
Screenshot No. 1: Profile of @refacemromania24, an account that paid for ads promoting candidate Călin Georgescu on at least two occasions.
Screenshot No. 2: Profile of @.pachy16, an account that paid for ads promoting candidate Călin Georgescu on at least three occasions.
This report is part of the access://democracy project funded by the Mercator Foundation. Its contents do not necessarily represent the position of the Mercator Foundation.